

Analysis of Packed and Obfuscated Program Binaries

Kevin Roundy
University of Wisconsin

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Analysis-Resistant Malware

GhostNet

- Hacked embassies all over SE Asia

Conficker

90% of malware resists analysis [1]

- Dynamically generated code
- Overwritten code
- Obfuscated control flow



[1] Packer (r)evolution, *Panda Research, 2008*

Dynamically Generated Code

75% of malware apply tools to *pack* their binaries, generating code at runtime [1]

Original Malware Binary

Packed Binary



obfuscated bootstrap code

original binary initially compressed or encrypted

payload program is generated at runtime

control transfer to unpacked code

Dynamically Generated Code

75% of malware apply tools to *pack* their binaries, generating code at runtime [1]


Original Malware Binary



Packer growth rate of 6-8% per month [2]

75% of new malware uses custom packing [1]

Packed Binary



payload program is generated at runtime

control transfer to unpacked code


[1] Malware Prevalence August 2008, Panda Research, 2008

[2] Exepacker Blacklisting Part 2, Virus Bulletin, March 2007

Overwritten Code


Self-modifying programs
overwrite code at runtime

CFG - initial



invalidated
code

CFG - after write




unreachable
code

new
code

Obfuscated Control Flow

Statically un-analyzable
control flow hides code



Our Goal


Analyze the code,
monitor and control the program

Solution: Hybrid analysis


- Parsing *static techniques*
- Instrumentation-based code discovery
- Code overwrite detection *dynamic techniques*
- Signal- and exception-monitoring

Control Transfers to Instrument


Invalid control transfers



Indirect jumps/calls




Return instructions



Instrumentation-Based Discovery

Dyninst

Monitored Program



stopThreadExpr

- Evaluates instrumentation predicate
 - `constExpr`
 - `dynamicTargetExpr`
- Causes Dyninst to invoke synchronous callback
 - `cb (instrumentedAddr, targetAddr)`

Code Discovery Algorithm


Hybrid code discovery:

Parse from known entry points

Instrument control flow that may lead to new code

Resume execution

Instrumentation discovers new entry points



Code Discovery Algorithm


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Instrumentation discovers new entry points



Overwritten Code Discovery



Overwrite Detection

Possible strategies

- Check each instruction in the trace for changes [1]
- Monitor writes to code regions


Page-level detection [2]

- Remove write permissions from code pages
- Write to code causes exception
- Handle exception

[1] Royal et al. PolyUnpack. ACSAC '06

[2] Maebe, De Bosschere. AADEBUG '03


Overwritten Code Discovery



Updating the CFG

- emulate write instruction
- remove overwritten and unreachable blocks
- parse at entry points to overwritten regions


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


Optimizations

Cases to consider

- large incremental overwrites
- writes to data

Overwritten Code Discovery



Optimizations


Cases to consider

- large incremental overwrites
- writes to data

Delaying the update

- until write routine terminates

Overwritten Code Discovery




Delayed updates

Two components

1. Handle overwrite signal

2. Update CFG when writes end

Overwritten Code Discovery




Delayed updates

Two components

1. Handle overwrite signal
 - a) instrument write loop exits
 - b) copy overwritten page
 - c) restore write permissions
 - d) resume execution
2. Update CFG when writes end

Overwritten Code Discovery




Delayed updates

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


Delayed updates


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Signal and Exception Handler Discovery




Handler-Based Redirections [1]



[1] Popov, Debray, Andrews. Usenix 2007

Danekhar. <http://www.codeproject.com/KB/system/inject2exe.aspx> 2005


Instrumenting the Handlers



[1] Popov, Debray, Andrews. Usenix 2007

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Overall Algorithm

Parse from known entry points


Instrument control flow that may lead to new code

Resume execution

stopThreadExpr
(ptr[eax])
call ptr[eax]

overwrite
— **cb** →

exception
div eax, 0



Fully Analyzed Packed Programs

Packer	malware market share ^[1]	Dyninst
UPX	9.45%	yes
PolyEnE	6.21%	yes
EXECryptor	4.06%	
Themida	2.95%	
PECompact	2.59%	
Upack	2.08%	yes
nPack	1.74%	yes
Aspack	1.29%	yes
FSG	1.26%	yes
Asprotect	0.43%	
Armadillo	0.37%	
Yoda's Protector	0.33%	
WinUPack	0.17%	yes
MEW	0.13%	yes

Tamper-resistance techniques
(e.g., self-checksumming)

[1] Packer (r)evolution.
Panda Research, 2008.
Two-month average
Feb-March 2008.